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Monetary Policy under Discretion
Abstract
Monetary policy is most effective when public beliefs about future policies are actively
managed. This is the appeal of policy rules and commitment strategies, typically absent under
discretion. But when a policymaker has some private information — as is the case in reality
— belief management becomes an integral part of optimal discretion policies, too.
Solving for optimal policy in a simple New Keynesian model, this paper shows how dis-
cretionary losses are reduced when the policymaker has private information. Furthermore, dis-
inﬂations are pursued more vigorously, when the hidden information problem is larger, even
when inﬂation is partly backward-looking.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E31, E37, E47, E52, E58
Keywords: Optimal Monetary Policy, Discretion, Time-Consistent Policy, Markov-Perfect Equilibrium, In-
complete Information, Kalman Filter
11 Introduction
There are clear beneﬁts from commitment in monetary policy. Many economic decisions in the
private sector are forward-looking and depend on policy expectations. But typically, optimal pol-
icy is not time-consistent — for example in the presence of nominal rigidities. The ability to
commit to future policies is then crucial for an effective monetary policy. This beneﬁt is well-
known from the rules-versus-discretion literature (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon
1983b). But real-world policymakers generally retain a good deal of discretion in their decision
making process,1 begging the question whether these policymakers forgo substantial beneﬁts from
expectations management.
Most of the rules-versus-discretion literature is based on models of perfect information, sym-
metrically shared between the central bank and the public. In reality however, monetary policy is
conducted under imperfect and asymmetric information. Asymmetric information is an inherent
feature of delegated management; the conduct of monetary policy by a specialized central bank is
no exception.
This paper shows how belief management becomes an integral part of discretionary policies,
when the central bank has private information. In this case, the public will make inferences about
the hidden information based on observed policy actions such that current policies directly affect
inﬂation expectations.2 The trade-offs faced by a discretionary policymaker resemble then those
known from commitment problems.
Investigating the design of optimal policy when the central bank has proprietary information
also contributes to the literature on optimal transparency. Morris and Shin (2002) caution against
providing the public with too much information. But Woodford (2005) doubts whether their con-
1This is likely due to a variety of reasons, for example the inability to commit future policymakers, respectively
the inability to commit future majorities in a policy making committee, to speciﬁc future actions. Then there are also
reasons of model uncertainty and the practical impossibility of devising the kind of completely state-contingent plan
prescribed by the optimal commitment literature, see for example Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999). By and large,
these reasons also apply when implementing some form of inﬂation targeting.
2Of course, in equilibrium inﬂation always depends on monetary policy. But in perfect information models of
discretionary policy, this dependence occurs mostly indirectly and in ways beyond the control of a current period
policymaker.
2clusions will be relevant in a forward-looking model, where the economy is mostly affected by
expectations of future policies. The model analyzed here provides an intriguing counterexam-
ple to this conjecture, in that policy losses are lower under hidden information when comparing
discretionary policies in a New Keynesian model. Since hidden information gives scope for belief
management under discretion, the result occurs precisely for reasons stressed by Woodford (2005).
Attention is limited here to Markov-perfect policies. In the spirit of “bygones are bygones”,
Markov-perfect state variables equilibrium must be relevant for current payoffs. When the public
is imperfectly informed, its prior beliefs matter for public payoffs and they become a distinct, en-
dogenous state variable of the policy problem, which is inﬂuenced by policy actions. By managing
this state of (public) beliefs, the policymaker indirectly responds to past policies, even when rep-
utational mechanisms via history-dependent strategies, known from Barro and Gordon (1983b) or
Chari and Kehoe (1990), are excluded from the analysis.
In Markov-perfect models, a current decision-maker can inﬂuence a future decision-maker
only via endogenous state variables, such as capital or government debt. In the model presented
here, belief management leads to Markov perfect outcomes that share similarities with those from
models with commitment respectively reputational mechanisms. Previous research has already
recognized how discretionary outcomes can be improved by adding endogenous state variables
to the policy problem. Usually, this is done by modifying the central bank’s loss function, for
examplebyaddingconcernsforinterestratesmoothing(Woodford2003b)orbyreplacinginﬂation
stabilization with price level targeting (Vestin 2006).
What is novel about the present paper, is how beliefs naturally emerge as such an endogenous
state variable, without the need for modifying the central bank’s loss function or other aspects of
theeconomy. Totheextentthathiddeninformationproblemsareanessentialfeatureofinteractions
between policymakers and the public, this suggests that the importance of discretionary biases in
practice might be different, and likely smaller than what is suggested by full information models.3
The problem of “public learns about central bank” studied here is distinct from settings of
3In a related manner, Blinder’s (1998) account of his time as Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board is
dismissive about the relevance of time-inconsistency as a major distortion in real-world decisions at central banks.
3“bank learns about economy” studied for example by Sargent (1999), Aoki (2003) or Svensson
and Woodford (2004). In the latter settings, atomistic individuals take policy as given without
regard for inference problems faced by the policymaker. Policy constraints like the Phillips Curve
are largely preserved. In the linear quadratic case studied by Svensson and Woodford (2004),
certainty equivalence holds and optimal policies are identical to the full information case when
actual values are replaced by policymakers’ expectations. A key complication for my paper is that
the central bank is a strategic, not an atomistic player, who takes the public’s inference problem
into account when devising its policy. This changes the policy constraints in non-trivial ways.
The framework adopted here exclusively assigns the policymaker, and not the public, with
superior information. This is an extreme assumptions. Reality is best described by dispersed
information, endowing different bits and pieces of hidden knowledge to the private sector and
policymakers. The policy constraints change in dramatic ways when agents are learning about the
policymaker, because of his strategic position in the economy. Those strategic effects are the main
concern of the paper.
The effects of hidden information on optimal policy are illustrated with a simple New Keyne-
sian model — a model not chosen for its realism, but in order to document the differences with
the symmetric information benchmark most clearly within a widely studied setting. The paper
solves for the optimal discretion policy in a New Keynesian model where the output target of the
policymaker is not directly observed by the public. The public only observes policy actions, but
cannot disentangle whether the underlying shock to the output target is persistent or transitory. The
policymaker faces a direct feedback from higher inﬂation expectations when choosing more ex-
pansionary policies cautioning him to temporarily boost aggregate activity at the expense of higher
inﬂation. Compared to a full information model, a key difference is how optimal policy contracts
the economy in response to inﬂationary beliefs. Moreover it does so more vigorously, the larger
the credibility problems from hidden information. This result has important implications for the
conduct of optimal disinﬂations.
To the best of my knowledge, my paper provides the ﬁrst analysis of disinﬂations with an ex-
4plicitly optimizing monetary policymaker and unknown policy targets.4 The results conﬁrm con-
jectures by Sargent (1982) and Bordo et al. (2007) about the necessity to disinﬂate more quickly,
when credibility is at stake. Other economists, for example Gordon (1982), have rather argued for
prolonged and modest disinﬂation paths when inﬂation is persistent. Strikingly, my result is shown
to carry over also to a setting with a hybrid Phillips Curve, where inﬂation persistence is partly
exogenous. Evidently, disinﬂation costs are higher in such a setting. However, by bringing down
inﬂation expectations early on a more aggressive disinﬂation policy still minimizes these costs,
since it avoids inﬂation to persist based on ill-founded beliefs.
The information structure used here is similar to the models of Faust and Svensson (2001,
2002) and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) who cast their models within similar linear-quadratic
settings, but without providing a general framework capable of handling various models with en-
dogenous state variables. Faust and Svensson focus on the welfare effects of credibility with a
Lucas-supply curve. Using a forward-looking Phillips Curve, their results can be conﬁrmed and
extended here: Policy losses are reduced when output targets are unobservable, such that there is
an explicit role for public beliefs. This disciplines the pursuit of persistent output targets, even
when time-consistency is imposed on policy.
So far, problems of this kind have mostly been analyzed in highly stylized and often static
settings.5 But the models used for policy analysis are typically dynamic and of larger scale. The
technical appendix to this paper presents a ﬂexible, yet tractable way to analyze optimal policy
under hidden information, which is applicable to the kind of DSGE models used in policy analysis.
The procedure remains tractable and transparent by relying on a linear-quadratic representation of
the policy problem driven by Gaussian shocks. A key complication for models with imperfect
information is to track the distribution of public beliefs. In a linear, homoscedastic setting, that
4The closest counterpart to my analysis should be the work of Ireland (1995) who imposes a sluggish response of
public beliefs to policy announcements.
5See for example the classic contributions by Backus and Drifﬁll (1985a), Canzoneri (1985) and Cukierman and
Liviatan (1991), where my deﬁnition of static includes also repeated play of one-period games. More recent work
includes the papers by Ball (1995) and Walsh (2000). Fully dynamic, but limited in size, are the models of Gas-
par, Smets, and Vestin (2006), Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002), Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). A more detailed
discussion of the literature can be found in Section 5.
5collapses to tracking the evolution of means via the Kalman ﬁlter.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces hidden information
in a textbook version of the New Keynesian model and shows how hidden information changes the
policy problem. An extension incorporating belief shocks is shown in Section 3. Implications for
disinﬂation strategies are analyzed in Section 4. The related literature is discussed in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes the paper. A technical appendix extends the methods used here to a general
class of linear quadratic policy problems.
2 A Simple Model of Hidden Information
Thissectionillustratestheissuesarisingfromhiddeninformationwithasimpletextbookversionof
the New Keynesian model. The model model is purely forward-looking and the signal extraction
problem is univariate. The next section extends this model to a setting where a hybrid Phillips
Curve interacts with shocks from a richer information structure.
2.1 New Keynesian Economy
The model is largely identical to the textbook model of optimal policy in a New Keynesian model
known from Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), Walsh (2003) or Woodford (2003a). The only
difference is a stochastic preference shock to the policymaker’s objective function, which is un-
observable to the public. Otherwise my model and its notation follow closely Gali (2003) where
further details can be found. A key feature of the model is that inﬂation is determined purely by
public expectations of current and future policies. This puts centerstage the concerns of the public
about the policymaker’s intentions.
Private Sector
As in the textbook model, aggregate decisions of the private sector are represented by the New
Keynesian Phillips and IS curves. In this simple model, IS curve and the short term interest rate
6are even redundant and the output gap can be used as policy control.
The private sector is populated by a continuum of identical ﬁrms and households, which trade
goods and labor services. There is no capital accumulation and output equals consumption. Firms
are monopolistically competitive and use staggered price-setting as in Calvo (1983). Optimal
pricing decisions lead to the New Keynesian Phillips Curve as in Yun (1996) and King and Wolman
(1996). The log-linearized Phillips Curve is
πt = βπt+1|t + κxt (1)
where πt is inﬂation and xt is the output gap6. The parameter β is the representative agent’s
discount factor and κ is a reduced form parameter inﬂuenced amongst others by the frequency
of price-setting.7 For any variable zt+1, zt+1|t denotes its private sector forecast. The underlying
information set will be explained later.
The output gap measures the difference between actual output and its natural rate. The latter
would be the output of the economy if there were no nominal frictions.8 My discussion will
exclusively focus on monetary shocks that leave the natural rate unaffected. Conditional on those
shocks, variations in the output gap are thus identical to variations in output and consumption.
Policy Objectives








t+k + αx(xt+k − ¯ xt+k)
2	
(2)
6Throughout the paper, all variables are in log-deviations from steady state, which implicitly assumes the existence
and uniqueness of a steady state under discretionary policy.
7Details are given by Gali (2003, p. 159) from whom notation is adopted.
8King and Goodfriend (1997) explain how the New Keynesian model can be separated into a core real business-
cycle model (RBC), which evolves as if there were no nominal frictions, and a set of “gap” variables that track the
difference between the RBC core and the actual economy. This separation has been widely adopted for example in the
textbooks of Walsh (2003), Woodford (2003a) and Gali (2008).
7with αx ≥ 0. The expectations operator Et reﬂects the policymaker’s information set, to be de-
scribed later. The non-standard feature of the loss function is the time-varying target for the output
gap, ¯ xt, which will be speciﬁed as an exogenous stochastic process.
In principle, one could think of various ways to motivate the presence of ¯ xt in the loss func-
tion9. However, the information structure used below will require that ¯ xt is not observed by the
private sector. To keep the model close to the NK benchmark, I maintain the assumption of a
homogeneously informed private sector and follow Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) who interpret
the output target as arising from time-varying preferences of the policymaker. Under this view, ¯ xt
represents the outcome of political inﬂuences on monetary policy to stimulate the economy. These
preferences are assumed to vary exogenously with political representation in the government and
the makeup of central banker’s preferences.10 Such hidden pressures could arise even when the
independence of the central bank is formally enshrined in law, since actual independence is a more
fragile concept. For example Abrams (2006) gives a striking account of hidden but forceful policy
inﬂuences. His study documents how U.S. President Nixon covertly pressured the then Chairman
of the Federal Reserve, Arthur Burns to ease policy in the run-up to the Great Inﬂation.
Under either interpretation, the output target is capturing a form of heterogeneity otherwise
not present in the model. In particular (2) does not necessarily represent a social welfare func-
tion. Faust and Svensson (2001) use a similar loss function for the policymaker. Their notion of




t. But without specifying the underlying heterogeneity and associated welfare
weights this is at best an aggregation with unknown distributional consequences.
In reality, short-term interest rates are the typical instruments of monetary policy. But in this
9For starters, time-variation in the output target could arise from variations in wedges between the frictionless
and the efﬁcient level of output. Time-varying markups would for example shrink distortions from monopolistic
competition. There are non-monetary tools to ﬁght such distortions, for example the kind of ﬁscal tools discussed by
Gali (2003). ¯ xt could then capture changes in the government’s policy of handling these distortions.
10In the real world, pressures mounted on central bankers appear to be a recurring, though not necessarily permanent
feature. For example, in the short history of the ECB there were the early attempts by German Finance Minister “Red”
Oskar Lafontaine and later overtures from the French President Nicolas Sarkozy.
11In the results discussed below there will not be a conﬂict in ranking outcomes under this measure as opposed to
the policymaker’s objective.
8simple model, the short term interest rate can be perfectly substituted by the output gap as policy
control. The IS curve is then redundant for determining equilibrium.
Discretionary Policy under Symmetric Information
Before turning to the informational structure of the model, it is helpful to study optimal policy
when there is symmetric information. For the time being, let the output target follow a univariate
AR(1) process
¯ xt+1 = ρ ¯ xt + et+1 where et+1 ∼ N(0,σ
2
e) and |ρ| < 1
which is mutually observed by the policymaker and the public.12 Under symmetric information,
their expectations coincide such that zt+1|t = Etzt+1 for any variable zt.
Lacking a commitment technology, the policymaker can always reoptimize his policies and
for each optimization he takes his future choices as given. Sine there are only exogenous state
variables, he takes the public’s inﬂation expectations as given, too.13 Only Markov-perfect, discre-
tionary equilibria are considered. This excludes for example trigger strategies to support commit-
ment outcomes.
The solution to this problem is well known. The ﬁrst order condition balances the inﬂation cost
against the desire to attain the output target:
αx(xt − ¯ xt) + κπt = 0 (3)
(Section 2.3 below, will compare this optimality condition against its counterpart under hidden
information.) Substitution of (3) into the Phillips Curve yields the following Markov-perfect poli-
12The process is mean zero and allows also for negative targets. But all variables are in deviation from steady state.
By allowing for a (known) average target, this would lead to the classic inﬂation bias in steady state. (In the context of
the present model, details can be found in Woodford (2003a).) To be consistent with non-zero inﬂation in steady state,
the Phillips Curve is then viewed as allowing for indexation to the steady state rate of inﬂation as in Yun (1996).
13In general, the policymaker could not take inﬂation expectations as given numbers but as a given mapping from





κ2 + αx(1 − βρ)
¯ xt ≡ ¯ f ¯ xt and πt =
κ
1 − βρ
¯ f ¯ xt (4)
Inﬂationandoutputgapinheritthedynamicpropertiesofthetargetprocess. Awellknownproperty
of optimal policies in a linear quadratic framework is their certainty equivalence, which holds here,
too, since ¯ f does not depend on the volatility σe of the target shocks. Under hidden information,
this will be different.
Sensibly, ¯ f is bounded between zero and one. In principle, the policymaker could always attain
the output target by choosing ¯ f = 1, but for αx < ∞ this has to be weighed against the inﬂation
resulting from this policy. At the other extreme, there would be no inﬂation if ¯ f = 0, but only at
the cost of missing the target, which matters if αx > 0. Values outside the zero to one range would
lead to further target deviations and be associated with unnecessary inﬂation. This will be useful
to bear in mind when analyzing policies under hidden information.
Policies with ¯ f close to unity will be called “bold” and it is instructive to see how policy
depends on the preference weight αx and the persistence of the target process. Inspection of (4)
reveals the intuitive property that policies get bolder the higher the preference weight on output, in
fact ¯ f varies between zero and one when αx is varied between zero and inﬁnity.
Policies are less bold, when the target is persistent. Higher persistence of the target causes
higher persistence in policy and thus higher inﬂation. This is a dynamic version of the inﬂation
bias known from Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a) and similar to the
stabilization bias known from Svensson (1997).
Under hidden information there will be persistent and transitory shocks to the output target,
neither of them being directly observable to the public. As in the full information case, what
matters for the inﬂation response to a policy shock is its perceived persistence. The policymaker
will then seek policies that are as bold as possible, while trying to keep perceived persistence as
low as possible.
102.2 Hidden Information
Hidden information is introduced by assuming that the public can observe only policy, xt, but
not shocks to the policy target. To make the public’s signal extraction interesting, the target is
henceforth driven by two components, one persistent, one transitory:
¯ xt = τt + εt εt ∼ N(0,σ
2
ε) (5)
τt+1 = ρ τt + ηt+1 ηt ∼ N(0,σ
2
η) and 0 < |ρ| < 1 (6)
The private sector has no structural uncertainty about the economy. All parameters are known,
including the speciﬁcation of the target process. The public must however infer the realizations of
τt and εt based on the observed history of policies, denoted xt.14
The policymaker observes the complete history of the target components and his expectations
are typically different from those of the public. As before, for any variable zt, the policymaker’s
expectations are denoted Etzt+1 = E(zt+1|τt,εt) with the obvious property zt = Etzt. Public
expectations are zt+1|t = E(zt+1|xt). By construction, xt|t = xt and πt|t = πt (since inﬂation is a
choice variable of the private sector) but typically τt|t 6= τt and εt|t 6= εt.
Surprises in zt relative to the public’s past information will be called “innovations”. Formally,
they are deﬁned as
˜ zt ≡ zt − zt|t−1
Innovations provide an orthogonal decomposition of the public information set since ˜ zt|t−1 = 0.
Even though they are unpredictable from the public’s perspective, they may well be predictable
based on the complete information set, and typically Et−1˜ zt will not be identical to zero.
Since the model is linear with Gaussian disturbances, rational expectations of the public can
be computed recursively from the Kalman ﬁlter. Given prior beliefs zt|t−1 and xt|t−1, the public
14In principle, this includes also the history of inﬂation rates πt. But as a choice variable of the private sector,
inﬂation merely reﬂects the private sectors information set, without providing additional information beyond xt.
11observes a realization of policy xt and updates its beliefs according to




A convenient property of the Kalman update is that it preserves the linearity of the model.
The difference with adaptive expectations is that the gain coefﬁcient is an endogenous parameter,
identical to the least squares slope of projecting zt on ˜ xt. The present model is particularly simple
since there is only one observable, xt, such that Kz is a scalar. (A multivariate setting will be
illustrated in Section 3.)
Signal Extraction for Given Policy
As will be veriﬁed below, the optimal policy is linear and has the form
xt = fττt + fεεt + fbτt|t−1 (8)
for some scalars fτ, fε and fb. Compared to the symmetric information case, the dependence on
τt|t−1 is novel. It captures policy responses to public beliefs. As will be shown shortly, it inﬂuences
the persistence of policy shocks, which is a crucial factor in determining inﬂation.
The public belief system is a straightforward application of the Kalman ﬁlter with (6) as state
equation and (8) as measurement equation. In the parlance of time-series econometrics, policy
poses an unobserved components model to the public. Key for the Kalman ﬁlter is the ratio of pol-
icy loadings on the realized components of the output target, fε/fτ. Only these loadings, and not
fb, are relevant for the Kalman ﬁlter. (Details are given in Appendix B.) This “mixing ratio” fε/fτ
determines how much a policy innovation reveals about τt instead of εt. It allows the policymaker
to change the signal-to-noise ratio in the public’s signal extraction problem.
From the perspective of the public, policy is driven by the iid innovations ˜ xt and it has an
12innovations representation in the form of an ARMA(1,1) process:
xt = ρxt−1 + ˜ xt + ρψ˜ xt−1 (9)
with ψ = (fτ + fb)Kτ − 1
For the public, the above innovations representation is observationally equivalent to the hidden
components representation of policy (8). Both generate the same variances and autocovariances of
policy, whilst implying different impulse responses as will be illustrated below. Via ψ, the persis-
tence of this ARMA depends on the policy coefﬁcients fτ, fε and fb. For plausible assumptions
of the policy coefﬁcients, ψ is bounded between zero and minus one. For ψ = 0, persistence is
largest as policy follows an AR(1) with auto-correlation equal to ρ. For ψ = −1 both roots of the
ARMA(1,1) cancel and policy is iid. (Details can be found in Appendix A.)
Together with the Phillips curve (1), the innovations representation of policy is sufﬁcient to
determine inﬂation in a way which crucially depends on the “average persistence” of policy as









(1 + βρψ)˜ xt + xt|t−1

(10)
The policy function has two levers to affect the persistence of xt: First, there is the mixing ratio,
which has been discussed above. If policy largely ignores the persistent target, i.e. if fε/fτ is large
such that Kτ is close to zero, the MA root gets close to cancel the AR root and policy is (correctly)
perceived to be almost iid. In this case, inﬂation also approaches the solution (4) under symmetric
information with ρ = 0.
But due to the second lever, fb, things need not collapse to the AR(1) case, when the mixing
ratio tends to zero. In this case, ψ converges to ρ·fb, which is not necessarily zero.15 fb represents
the marginal reaction to people’s prior beliefs and affects the persistence of policy, too. A negative
15Since xt = xt|t in this simple model, it follows that fτKτ + fεKε = 1. When the mixing ratio goes to zero, this
collapses to fτKτ = 1.
13fb counteracts policy persistence induced by τt. The marginal reaction to beliefs is likely negative
since beliefs τt|t−1 will be inﬂationary; this conjecture will be veriﬁed in Section 2.4.
To keep inﬂation low, it is tempting to conclude that the policymaker should better ignore the
persistent output target. Alternatively, a high mixing ratio could be chosen, with a higher respon-
siveness to transitory than persistent shocks, for example fτ = 1 and fε = 100. But neither choice
would likely be a sensible policy, since output plays not only an informational role. Attaining
the output targets matters, too; calling for fτ = fε = 1 and fb = 0. For example, ignoring the
persistent target by setting fτ = fb = 0 alleviates inﬂationary cost, but it also leads to persistent
shortfalls from the τ-target. Neither would it appear sensible to overshoot the output target, for
example by setting fε = 100. The optimal trade-off is the subject of the next sections. But an im-
portant restriction imposed by rational expectations has already become clear: at least on average
actual policies must match public perceptions.
2.3 The Discretionary Policy Problem
This section sets up the discretionary policy problem for the simple, purely forward-looking New
Keynesianmodelwhenthereistheabovestructureofhiddeninformation. Extensionsofthemodel,
including a hybrid Phillips Curve, will be analyzed in subsequent sections of this paper. The
concepts and methods presented here are generalized to a wider class of linear quadratic models in
the technical appendix of this paper.
Markov Perfect Equilibria
Attention is limited here to Markov-perfect equilibria, which exclude reputational mechanisms via
the kind of history-dependent strategies considered by Barro and Gordon (1983b) or Chari and
Kehoe (1990) and avoids the associated multiplicity of equilibria. In the spirit of “bygones are by-
gones”, state variables in a Markov-perfect equilibrium must be relevant for current payoffs.16 In
16Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 11) review applications of Markov-perfect equilibria to macroeconomic
policy problems.
14the symmetric information setting shown above, these were the contemporaneous values τt and εt
(but not any elements of their history). Both of these state variables evolve in a purely exogenous
fashion which accounts for the myopic behavior of discretionary policy under symmetric informa-
tion: In Markov-perfect models, a current decision-maker can inﬂuence a future decision-maker
only via endogenous state variables, like capital or government debt. This channel is however
absent in the symmetric information version of the New Keynesian model.
Once hidden information is introduced, an additional state variable becomes relevant: Since
the public observes only xt but neither τt not εt, it is the public beliefs about the target components
which are relevant for public payoffs. Precisely, it is the prior beliefs (τt|t−1 and εt|t−1) and not the
posteriors (τt|t and εt|t) which qualify as state variables for the time t decision problem, since the
latter are already inﬂuenced by time t policies. In the present setting, εt is iid and εt|t−1 = 0 so





The transition equation for the new state variable is given by the Kalman Filter. The response
of beliefs to policy depends on the Kalman gain Kτ, which reﬂects how much policy reacts to τt.
τt+1|t = ρτt|t and τt|t = τt|t−1 + Kτ˜ xt (11)
The discretionary policymaker retains the freedom to reoptimize his policies at each point in
time. On the one hand, this allows a recursive representation of the policy problem as a dynamic
program. On the other hand, he does not commit to future policies so these have to be taken as
given in the decision problem. To be precise, what is taken as given is how the policymaker reacts
to future state variables: Future policies are not given numbers but a given function of future state
variables. This distinction is important here, since one of the state variables, τt+1|t, is under the
inﬂuence of current policy so that future outcomes can be inﬂuenced. The continuation value of




t + αx(xt − τt − εt)
2 + EtV
0(St+1) (12)
The linear quadratic nature of the model allows to guess (and verify) that the value function will















for some positive deﬁnite matrix V 0 with elements v0
13, v0
33 > 0 and a scalar v0. Throughout this
paper, a zero superscript “0” indicates coefﬁcients embodying a guess about (future) policy and
“t.i.p.” are terms independent of time t policy.
The time-invariant solution to the discretionary policy problem has the linear form anticipated
in (8). In principle, the policymaker is free to deviate from this “rule” at any time. He will just not
ﬁnd it optimal to do so.
An important constraint on the policy problem is the optimality of beliefs and decisions in the
private sector. Optimality of beliefs are captured by the Kalman ﬁlter (7) and the the policymaker
sees himself faced with a ﬁxed Kalman gain K0
τ when contemplating his policy problem. Optimal
decisions of the private sector are represented by the Phillips Curve (1) where the policymaker
takes as given how inﬂation expectations are related to future state variables; πt+1|t = g0τt+1|t for
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whose solution is indeed of the form anticipated in (8). Whilst beliefs embodied in g0, V 0 and
16K0
τ are taken as given in the policy problem, in equilibrium they must be consistent with the
solution to the policy problem. This poses an intricate ﬁxed point problem. Fixed points between
current expectations and future policy as in g0 and V 0 are common in Markov-perfect models
under symmetric information. What is new is the ﬁxed point between current policy and beliefs
about the systematic relationship between current policy and states contained in the Kalman gain
K0
τ.
Changed Policy Trade-Offs with Belief Management
The ﬁrst-order conditions of (13) require optimal policy to satisfy
αx(xt − ¯ xt) + κπt + ρK
0
τµt = 0 (16)
where µt is the multiplier on the belief constraint (15). It is the term involving µt which distin-
guishes the optimality condition (16) from its counterpart under symmetric information (3) dis-
cussed above.
To shed some light on the ﬁxed point considerations behind the solution to (13), suppose that
the output target is positive and the policymaker must balance an increase in output against its
inﬂationary costs. The marginal value of relaxing the belief constraint is likely positive, owing to
the positive autocorrelation in the persistent component of the target. Likewise, the Kalman gain
Kτ will be positive, since policy will co-move positively with the target. The new “belief term”
ρK0
τµt in(16) willthencaution thepolicymakeragainst pursuingthe output targettoo aggressively.
As will be seen in the numerical analysis below, optimal policy will be less bold under hidden
information — except when shocks to τt are so rare that the Kalman gain Kτ is very small.
The change in policy trade-offs under hidden information can be nicely illustrated with a pic-
ture similar to Kydland and Prescott (1977). Under symmetric information, the policymaker’s
indifference curves over output and inﬂation are concentric around πt = 0 and xt = ¯ xt = τt + εt.
The optimality condition (3) seeks the tangency point between the indifference curves and the pol-
17icy constraint. The latter being the Phillips Curve with intercept βπt+1|t = β¯ g0ρτt for some ¯ g0.
This is depicted by the dashed lines in Figure 1. In equilibrium, ¯ g0 must be identical to the optimal
policy coefﬁcient computed in (4), which is a positive number. That is, the larger policy responds
to a given level of the persistent target, the higher the intercept it faces in equilibrium.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Under hidden information belief management comes into play and changes the picture. To
reach some substantive conclusions, I am willing to make the following assumptions about the
policy coefﬁcients. Apart from being plausible, they will be veriﬁed to be true in the computations
belowforawiderangeofcalibrations. First, policyshouldreactpositivelytotargetshocks, f0
τ > 0.
Second, policy seeks to counteract belief f0
b < 0. But third, it still seeks to accommodate a target,
even when its realization coincides with public beliefs: f0
τ + f0
b > 0.17 These imply that Kτ and
g0 are positive.
A key result is that hidden information steepens the slope of the Phillips Curve when compared





















The steepening of the Phillips Curve worsens the policy trade-off and makes policies less bold
with respect to both target components. Underlining the importance of beliefs, the intercept of the
Phillips Curve depends now on the public’s prior beliefs, τt|t−1, instead of the actual value of τt.
Coming out of steady state with τt|t−1 = 0, this alone makes policies bolder than otherwise. An
important aspect for the ﬁxed point computations is that, via Kτ, the slope of the Phillips Curve
becomes ever steeper the bolder policies are with respect to τt, which again tames the boldness of
equilibrium policies.
17This assumption implies that the public expects policies to be expansionary, xt|t−1 > 0, when τt|t−1 > 0.
18Belief management changes the indifference curves as well. Most importantly, output acts
as a signal about the persistence of policy targets which again inﬂuences the evaluation of future
losses in the policy problem. This shifts output preferences, such that they are not centered around
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where the scalars γ0 > 0, γ1 ≶ 0 and γ2 > 0 depend on the coefﬁcients of (18). 18 These
















Regardless of slope and intercept of the Phillips Curve, x∗
t is the “maximally desirable” level of
output. Apart from its dependence on the original target term ¯ xt, it shifts both with the actual and
perceived level of the persistent target component τt. But for starters consider a transitory shock to
the output target, say εt = 1 whilst τt = τt|t−1 = 0: Any policy response will partly be attributed
to a persistent shock and thus increase τt+1|t causing future inﬂation. The associated losses to the
policymaker are captured by the γ0 term of the indifference curves. Independently of the Phillips
Curve, the policymaker does then not even desire to attain that transitory target but only a fraction
α/(α + γ0) thereof.
Since γ2 > 0, public beliefs τt|t−1 shift the indifference curves towards lower output levels.
While γ1 cannot be signed analytically, it happens to be positive over the range of calibrations con-
sidered below and this contributes to making policy less bold. All in all, prior beliefs of the public
τt|t−1 > 0 caution policy in two ways: First they increase inﬂation immediately (the intercept of
the Phillips Curve) and — if not counteracted by current policy — they herald future inﬂation and
18It is straightforward to show that γ0 > 0 follows from the positive deﬁniteness of the value function, and γ2 > 0
from the aforementioned assumptions on the policy coefﬁcients. Analytically, γ1 cannot be signed, but for the variety
of calibrations considered in the numerical simulations below it turns out to be positive.
19shrink the “maximally desirable” level of output, x∗
t, towards zero.
2.4 Optimal Policy in the Simple Model
This section presents results for the optimal policy. Calibration values are taken from Gali (2003)
with equally weighted policy preferences (αx = 1) and equal-probable shocks to the target compo-
nents (ση = σε = 1), see Table 1.19 The solution algorithm for the underlying ﬁxed point problem
is discussed in the technical appendix.
[Table 1 about here.]
Optimal Mixing Ratio and Belief Responses
Key statistics of the policy function are the mixing ratio fε/fτ, which governs the Kalman gains,
and fb via which policy responds to prior beliefs. As anticipated, fb is negative. The policy
response to τt|t−1 is synonymous with counteracting inﬂation expectations of the public formed in
the past. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the public’s prior beliefs of the hidden





How optimal policy seeks to quell past beliefs can be seen from the impulse response shown in
Figure2. Theﬁrst twocolumns showresponses toshocks in τt and εt. The thirdcolumn documents
responses to initial conditions τt = 0,εt = 0,τt|t−1 = 1. This corresponds to a situation where
the policymaker is faced with erroneous beliefs about his inﬂationary output preferences. The
optimal response is a prolonged contraction until beliefs and outcomes have settled back in steady
state after about four periods. Given that the New Keynesian model generally lacks endogenous
persistence, thelengthofthislearningprocessisaremarkableoutcomeechoingtheresultsofErceg
19Given the limited range of shocks considered, the calibration is not designed to match the level of variations
observed in the data.
20and Levin (2003). Moreover, the effect of ﬁghting past beliefs is also present in the other impulse
responses. When the true target shock is iid, this leads to a contractionary policy one period after
the shock. This pattern is similar (though not fully identical) to commitment policies under full
information. In both cases, a credible promise to undo expansionary shocks in the future lowers
inﬂation expectations; similar to the disciplinary channel emphasized by Walsh (2000), Faust and
Svensson (2001) and Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2006).
[Figure 2 about here.]
The other lever of policy is the mixing ratio, which is higher compared to the full information
case.20 Under hidden information, policy is less bold in its pursuit of persistent output targets. This
lowers the signal-to-noise ratio in the public’s signal extraction problem and the public (correctly)
places a lower probability on a policy innovation ˜ xt being caused by a persistent target shock.
Innovation Responses
The model with hidden policy components is observationally equivalent to a symmetric informa-
tion model where the policy target follows a univariate ARMA(1,1). Both yield the same second
moments and have identical likelihoods. But there is an important difference: The hidden com-
ponents model distinguishes different sets of impulses responses, which can be associated with
different episodes in monetary policy.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The differences between true impulse responses and public beliefs are illustrated in Figure 3.
For output and inﬂation, the ﬁgure shows two sets of impulse response: First, the expected re-
sponses computed by the public, after observing a unit innovation in policy, ˜ xt, at time zero. After
its initial upwards jump, output remains expanded at about half its impact value and decays persis-
tently thereafter. The inﬂation path is equally equally elevated and persistent.
20For the baseline calibration, the mixing ratio is 1.2340 under symmetric information and 1.2866 under hidden
information.
21Secondly, the ﬁgure shows the true responses to the structural shocks τt and εt, computed under
the full information measure spanned by (τt,εt). They are scaled such as to yield a unit innovation
in output as well. After a shock to the persistent target, τt, policy is persistently more expansive
than originally expected by the public. The difference between these two sets of impulse response
represents the errors of public forecasts made in the initial period. As the structural responses
unfold, the public learns about the true nature of the shock. The ﬁgure also shows how public
beliefs are updated in subsequent periods, leading to persistent upwards, respectively downwards
revisions of beliefs. The innovations responses are rational and on average correct. Persistently
positive forecast errors to a shock in τt are offset by persistently negative forecast errors when a
shock to εt occurs.
When particular periods are supposed to have been dominated by one set of shocks rather than
another, patterns of persistent forecast errors in public beliefs should be reﬂected in survey data.
For example, Erceg and Levin (2003) use survey data to characterize the Volcker disinﬂation as
a period of persistently excessive inﬂation forecasts. Their model uses a Gaussion information
structure similar to mine, but for a ﬁxed policy rule. The methods presented here can be used to
derive the parameters of such a rule within an explicitly optimizing framework of monetary policy
under hidden information.
Sensitivity Analysis of Policy Coefﬁcients
Policy trade-offs are particularly affected by two parameters: The relative variance of transitory to
persistent target shocks and the preference weight αx, whereas increases in the slope of the Phillips
Curve, κ, affect policy trade-offs similarly to decreases in αx.21 When considering changes in the
importance of the target components εt and τt, the overall variance of the output target will be ﬁxed
at some level σ2
¯ x. Denoting the weight on τt by ω ∈ [0;1] this translates into
σ
2
ε = (1 − ω)σ
2
¯ x and σ
2




21The loss function can be written as Lt = κ2¯ π2
t + αx(xt − ¯ xt)2, where ¯ πt =
P∞
j=0 βjxt+j|t.
22Figure 4 documents changes in the policy coefﬁcients fτ, fε, fb as well as the mixing ratio
fε/fτ due to variations in ω and αx. The upper panels also show the corresponding values of
fτ and fε under symmetric information. Because of certainty equivalence, their surfaces are ﬂat
along the ω-axis. When there is hidden information, fε is uniformly smaller than under symmetric
information. This is caused by the public’s inability to distinguish between realizations in the
two target components. Any innovation in xt will be partly attributed to have been caused by the
persistent component τt. This has two adverse effects in the ﬁrst-order condition (16): First, if the
true shock was to the iid component εt, inﬂation will be higher compared to the full information
case. Second, since the public expects the target change to have some persistence, there will also
be inﬂationary costs in the future, tracked by µt. Both effects caution the policymaker and lower
fε compared to the full information case.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Because of the second effect, fτ is mostly smaller under hidden information as well. As the
public underestimates the persistence of policy after a shock to τt (see Figure 3), inﬂation is lower
than under full information. This would give the policymaker some slack in pursuing the output
target, if it were not mostly outweighed by the marginal effect of policy on beliefs, which are
represented by the term ρKτµt in the ﬁrst-order condition (16). However, when the probability of
a persistent shock is very small (ω close to zero) or when the policymaker is known not to care
much about attaining it (αx small), the Kalman gain Kτ will be small and public beliefs τt|t will be
very insensitive to policy and their importance vanishes in (16). In those cases, persistent shocks
are very hard to detect for the public. But when they occur, the policy response can be bolder than
under symmetric information as is shown in Panel (a) of Figure 4.
It is worth recalling that a higher mixing ratio and a more negative reaction to prior beliefs
increase the persistence of the policy process, causing higher inﬂation. Indeed, as can be seen from
Panel (c) of the ﬁgure, fb is negative everywhere. The belief reaction is strongly negative, when
there is more weight on inﬂation in the loss function (smaller values of αx) and when persistent
23shocks are more prevalent (ω close to one). Both cases make it more important, respectively more
likely, that inﬂationary beliefs are kept in check.
Under discretion, the policymaker takes the public’s belief system as given, without actively
seeking inﬂuence it, whereas commitment policymaker would have to consider the systematic
effects of his actions on the Kalman gain for example. Still it is instructive to see how policy affects
the public’s signal-to-noise ratio via the mixing ratio. As shown in Panel (d), this ratio increases
when policy preferences place more weight on output than inﬂation. As inﬂation becomes more
and more costly for the policymaker, fτ is decreasing faster than fε, which makes it ever harder
for the public to detect persistent policy changes. When changing ω, the mixing ratio is largest
for intermediary values, typically above ω ≥ 0.5. In this range, hidden information problem is
most prevalent and a high mixing ratio helps to lessen the sensitivity of beliefs to policy. When
ω approaches unity, the public can expect any policy to be caused by a persistent shock with
near certainty and the mixing ratio drops to its full information level. When the target is almost
exclusively driven by iid shocks (ω → 0) expected future inﬂation drops towards zero and the
mixing ratio drops to one as fτ approaches fε.
Policy Losses
Comparing policies under hidden information against outcomes under full information begs the
question what would be the preferred setting. Considering the loss function of the policymaker, it
turns out that the ex-ante expectation of the policy loss, E(Vt) is improved under hidden informa-
tion over the wide range of calibrations discussed above. Figure 5 reports how the improvement
in policy losses under hidden information are large enough that an average inﬂation rate corre-
sponding to about one-standard deviation unit would have to be added to inﬂation under hidden
information for policy losses to be equal; the compensating inﬂation is somewhat smaller when
the volatility weight on persistent shocks, ω, is very small; and it can be considerably larger when
persistent shocks are very prevalent and the weight on inﬂation stabilization is large.22
22Additional details are given in Appendix C.
24[Figure 5 about here.]
Moreover, the same holds when considering the notion of “representative” loss discussed in
Section 2.1. The reason is simply that the improvement in outcomes is due to the policymaker’s
restraint in pursuing the output targets. By lowering inﬂation and output gap, this is clearly ben-
eﬁcial for the “representative” loss, which would be minimized by keeping the output gap at zero
anyway.
The beneﬁts of reduced inﬂation also outweigh the policy losses from staying away from the
targets, at least from an ex-ante perspective considering both persistent and transitory shocks as
wellastheirrespectivelikelihoods.23 Conditionalontheoccurenceofaniidshockεt, inﬂationisof
course higher, and the policymaker misses the target by more than he would under full information,
see Figure 2. On average, this is however outweighed by the beneﬁts incurred when a persistent
shock occurs.
Considering the different levers present in the policy function (8) under hidden information, a
quantitative decomposition of the reduction in policy loss looks as follows: First, there is the opti-
mal policy under symmetric information. Feeding this same policy through the system but under
the hidden information, losses drop by an amount, correspond to a compensating rate of average
inﬂation of about one third of the standard deviation of inﬂation in the new equilibrium. The opti-
mal policy under hidden information then seeks to improve upon this by changing the mixing ratio
and by reacting to past beliefs. Using the optimal mixing ratio, but neglecting the response to prior
beliefs (fb = 0) makes expected losses drop further; compared to full information the compensat-
ing average inﬂation amounts to about one standard deviation of inﬂation. In addition to this, the
optimal policy reacts also negatively to prior beliefs and the average inﬂation compensating for the
improvement in losses over full information equals almost two standard deviations of inﬂation. For
comparison, the difference in full information losses of discretion and commitment corresponds
to a compensating average inﬂation of about two-and-a-half standard deviations of inﬂation under
discretion.
23Expected loss, E(Vt), is the unconditional expectation of the policymaker’s value function across states of nature.
(See the Technical Appendix for computational details.) Optimal policy is of course deﬁned on a state-by-state basis.
253 Belief Shocks
The simple New Keynesian model analyzed so far has only one communication channel between
policymaker and public: Policy actions themselves. Since policy is driven by more shocks than
there are communication channels, the public cannot perfectly infer the drivers of policy, not even
in equilibrium. In reality, there are however other communication channels than the policy instru-
ment itself. If these channels are informative, they will alleviate the public’s inference problems
andaffectthescopeofbeliefmanagementforpolicy. Thissectionextendstheinformationstructure
of the simple model to a richer setting, nesting the cases of full and hidden information considered
before.
In addition to observing policy, the public is now assumed to receive a noisy signal about the
persistent output target. The target signal is contaminated by noise shocks nt, which will be called
“belief shocks”. They are iid and the public’s measurement vector is
Zt =

xt (τt + nt)
0
where nt ∼ N(0,σ
2
n)
and the notation for public beliefs of a variable zt is now adapted to
zt|t ≡ E(zt|Z
t)
The presence of two correlated observables in the public’s inference problem requires to extend
the univariate ﬁltering methods discussed in the previous section. Also, the state vector needs to
be augmented by nt. (Notice that nt|t−1 = 0.) A detailed presentation of handling this and larger
settings has been relegated to the technical appendix.
The belief shocks are uncorrelated with fundamentals (here: τt and εt) and play no role under
symmetric information. But under asymmetric information they matter since they are correlated
with an informative signal about fundamentals, giving rise to ﬂuctuations driven by “non funda-
26mental” shocks.24 Inﬂation is affected by belief shocks via the forward-looking Phillips Curve (1),
making it suboptimal for policy to ignore belief shocks. As with given prior beliefs about the out-
put target (τt|t−1), they will raise inﬂation and optimal policy should want to ﬁght their effects by
contracting output. In the present model, economic responses to noise shocks will exhibit patterns
similar to cost-push shocks, echoing results of Angeletos and La’O (2008b).
By changing the volatility of noise shocks, the extended model also nests the cases of hidden
and full information analyzed in the previous section. The scope for hidden information increases
with the volatility of belief shocks. For σn = 0, the model is identical to the full information
model, since τt is perfectly observable. The opposite occurs when σn is very large. In this case,
the signal becomes useless and the model converges to the hidden information setting from the
previous section where policy is the only observable.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Impulse responses to a noise shock are shown in Figures 6, again using the baseline calibration
from Table 1. Under this conﬁguration, each of the three shocks in this model occurs with the same
probability. When the target signal τt + nt goes up because of a noise shock, this leads to ample
confusion for the public. Current and expected inﬂation rise, since the public attributes part of
the signal to the persistent target τt, To counteract these erroneous beliefs, policy contracts output.
This is sensible in two ways: First it directly lowers inﬂation via the output term in (1). Second, it
signals that the target τt may in fact not have gone up and thus reduces expected inﬂation. In the
baseline calibration, it takes about four periods (one year) to ﬁght these erroneous beliefs.
The resulting pattern of contracting output and elevated inﬂation is similar to the dynamics
known from cost-push shocks. Figure 6 also documents that public beliefs of future output and
inﬂation are both elevated during the entire episode, which distinguishes belief shock induced
dynamics from cost-push behavior, since the latter would typically be accompanied by an expected
recession as well.
24The meaning of “fundamentals” is intended here in the sense of the full-information economy.
27Varying Transparency
How does policy change with the volatility of belief shocks? To answer this question, Figure 7
shows how policy coefﬁcients and expected losses change when σn is varied between zero and
inﬁnity. As discussed above, the limit points in this experiment are the symmetric information
model, respectively the previously studied model with no target signal except for policy. The
policy coefﬁcients fτ, fε and fb vary smoothly and monotonically between the comparative statics
of hidden vs full information studied before. They are all smaller and policy losses are reduced as
the extent of hidden information increases with σn.
[Figure 7 about here.]
The policy response to noise shocks is always negative. The reasons are similar to what has
been discussed in the previous section for the negative response to prior beliefs fb. A contraction
lowers inﬂation directly via the Phillips Curve and indirectly via beliefs. For better comparison
with the other coefﬁcients, the middle left panel of Figure 7 shows how the policy reaction to one-
standard deviation shock, fn · σn changes with the shock variance. The noise response peaks at an
intermediary level of the noise variance, where the public places roughly equal weight on policy
and the target signal in its updating of beliefs.
τt|t = τt|t−1 + Kx˜ xt + Ks(˜ τt + nt) (19)
Changes in the Kalman gains Kx and Ks for various noise levels are shown in the bottom left panel
of Figure 7. In the extremes the response of policy to noise shocks is zero, as either the size of the
shock shrinks to zero (and there are no erroneous beliefs to ﬁght) or the public pays no attention to
a signal with inﬁnite noise.
A natural interpretation of variations in noise variance is to view these as changes in trans-
parency about the central bank’s output target. The above results then document clear disadvan-
tages from transparency. In a somewhat related model, Faust and Svensson (2001, Proposition 6.3)
appear to establish the opposite: Namely that central bank losses were increasing, not decreasing,
28in transparency. The difference lies here in the deﬁnition of “transparency”, and it is instructive to
see how apparently innocuous differences in a model’s setting can lead to different conclusions.
In the experiments of Faust and Svensson, transparency means that targets can be perfectly
inferred once policy is observed. In the experiments above, transparency (σn = 0) makes the
target component τt directly observable, regardless of policy. Both imply the same information
sets in equilibrium. But the constraints faced by the discretionary policymaker differ in profound
ways. Under discretion, the policymaker takes the public beliefs system and its Kalman gains as
given. When the target is perfectly observable, as is the case above, the current policymaker cannot
inﬂuence beliefs, since the Kalman gain Kx in (19) is zero.25 In contrast, when targets are perfectly
inferable from observed policies, this link is retained causing the difference in outcomes.
4 (In-)Credible Disinﬂations and Exogenous Persistence
A pertinent question in monetary policy is whether to conduct disinﬂations quickly or gradually.
The answer involves a minimization of the economic costs incurred by the necessary output con-
tractionsalongthedisinﬂationpath. Thesecostshingeonthepersistenceofinﬂation. Ifpersistence
is large, a larger or more protracted contraction might be necessary. A pertinent policy question
is then whether to chose the “cold turkey” approach of a quick disinﬂation, involving a large ini-
tial contraction, or whether to chose a more gradual approach, implementing a longer sequence of
smaller contractions.
Academic research has offered different advice on these issues, see for example the discussion
between Gordon (1982) and Sargent (1982). Arguments for or against either approach differ in
whether credibility is assumed to have an effect on inﬂation persistence or not. A quick disinﬂa-
tion could enhance the credibility of the policymaker’s intention to disinﬂate and help reducing
the inﬂation rate by itself. Taking this view, Sargent (1982) favors the “cold turkey” approach.
Being more concerned with exogenous sources of inﬂation persistence makes Gordon (1982) lean
25This is similar to what Faust and Svensson, p. 374 call the regime “OG: observable goal and intention”, for which
they ﬁnd results corresponding to what has been found in this paper.
29towards advocating more gradual disinﬂation paths.
The framework presented in this paper allows to address these questions in a fully dynamic
framework with an optimizing policymaker. The linear quadratic approach allows to handle multi-
ple, endogenous state variables, including those arising from partially backward-looking inﬂation
dynamics. To the best of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst explicitly optimizing analysis of disinﬂa-
tion strategies when policy goals are unobserved.26
The following disinﬂation experiment is considered: How should policy react to a surge in
inﬂation due to unfounded public beliefs? In an admittedly stylized way, this resembles the initial
conditions of the Volcker disinﬂation as discussed by Erceg and Levin (2003) and Goodfriend
and King (2005). Such inﬂation beliefs may be caused by a belief shock, nt, or inherited via
πt|t−1 = g0 τt|t−1. Qualitatively, results are similar in either case and the discussion below will
focus on responses to belief shocks.
In the model of the previous sections, the cost of disinﬂation depends largely on the policy-
maker’s capability to lower policy expectations quickly. In the belief shock model of the previous
section, policy induces a stronger contraction of the economy in response to beliefs τt|t−1 when
credibility problems are larger, see the middle right panel of Figure 7.27 While this suggests that
disinﬂations should be more aggressive, it does not yet speak to concerns about the trade-offs under
exogenous inﬂation persistence.
To see how policy changes in the presence of exogenous persistence, the Phillips Curve is
26Related is the work of Ireland (1995) who ﬁnds similar results when imposing a sluggish response of public beliefs
on policy announcements. As an alternative, Ireland (1997) seeks to reconcile the conjectures of Sargent (1982) and
Gordon (1982) by differentiating between disinﬂations at high or low levels of inﬂation.
27Similarly, the negative response to a belief shock is stronger for larger values of σn, up to the point where the
growing noise variance beliefs react less and less to these shocks as .
















In this hybrid Phillips Curve (20), inﬂation is not only determined by the expected path of future
policies known from (1), but also by lagged inﬂation. Policy innovations are still the ultimate
driver of inﬂation, but they carry less weight in changing current inﬂation.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Figure 8 compares impulse responses to a belief shock nt when varying the indexation rate
γ ∈ {0;0.5;1}; for γ = 0 the model is identical to what has been studied above.29 For better
comparison of the disinﬂation policies, the belief shocks have been scaled such as to yield a unit
innovation in inﬂation on impact. As higher indexation rates increase exogenous inﬂation persis-
tence, optimal policy contracts the economy ever more aggressively to a belief shock — bolstering
the case for the “cold turkey” approach. The lower panel of Figure 8 conﬁrms this also over a
wider range of values for the noise variance σ2
n.
Even though policy contracts the economy more vigorously when exogenous persistence is
larger, disinﬂations are not necessarily quicker. Due to the higher exogenous persistence in inﬂa-
tion it takes longer for inﬂation to fall when γ is larger. Policy cannot avoid the higher degree of
backward-lookingness in inﬂation. But this is precisely why an aggressive initial contraction is
warranted. It does not only ﬁght beliefs as in the previous section. By reducing current inﬂation, it
reduces also the amount of future inﬂation caused by ill-founded beliefs to be carried forward via
the backward-looking term in the Phillips Curve.
28As in Woodford (2003a) or Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) this can be derived from the optimizing
behavior of Firms under Calvo pricing. Firms who do not optimize their prices are supposed to change prices at the
rate Π
γ
t−1 where Πt−1 is last period’s level (not log) of inﬂation. As shown by Woodford (2003a), this changes also
welfare functions such as (2) to be concerned with quasi-differenced inﬂation πt − γπt−1 instead of inﬂation. The
point of the experiment is here is however to consider how exogenous persistence changes policies whilst keeping the
objective function constant. The policymaker’s loss function is thus kept unchanged.
29Other parameters are calibrated at the values shown in Table 1.
315 Related Literature
Since asymmetric information is such a pertinent issue in policymaking, it is no wonder, that
there is a wide body of related literature. General surveys can be found in Rogoff (1989), Walsh
(2003, Chapter 8) and Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 15). The literature can roughly be
classiﬁed by answering the following questions: Who learns about what and how? How is policy
described, as an explicit optimization problems or by a behavioral policy rule? In this paper, policy
is optimized while the public solves a signal extraction problem about hidden policy targets.
The tractability of the solution method presented here stems from the unobservable states fol-
lowing smooth, Gaussian processes as opposed to regime switches. Discrete regime switches are
attractive for modeling central bank “types” like weak/soft or commitment/discretion as in Backus
and Drifﬁll (1985b), Cukierman and Liviatan (1991), Ball (1995), Walsh (2000) and King, Lu,
and Pasten (2008). Unobserved regime switches lead to important non-linearities in the public’s
inference problem, which complicate the constraints in an optimal policy problem considerably.
The aforementioned literature has correspondingly focused on very small state spaces and/or ﬁnite
horizon problems, since unobserved regimes switches are hard to incorporate into the kind of gen-
eral dynamic settings commonly used for policy analysis. Svensson and Williams (2006) discuss
the resulting difﬁculties in more detail.
Learning about regime-switches does not pose such problem when it is the central bank who
learns about economic conditions as in Sargent (1999). This is because of the strategic behavior
of the policymaker when facing agents learning about, respectively from, him as opposed to the
non-strategic behavior of atomistic private agents.
Svensson and Woodford (2003, 2004), Aoki (2006) study optimal policy with an imperfectly
informed central bank in linear quadratic settings similar to mine. A convenient feature of this
approach is that the public’s “learning” reduces to a time-invariant signal extraction problem. This
is different from the kind of evolutionary belief system studied in the learning literature represented
for example by Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Adaptive learning leads to interesting dynamics
where past data drives changes in regression coefﬁcients, but is so far hard to capture in optimal
32policy problem. For ﬁxed policy rules, the issue is analyzed by Orphanides and Williams (2005,
2006). An exception is the work of Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2006) who endow the public with a
time-varying, adaptive learning rule. They derive a Markov-perfect policy with history dependence
induced similarly as here via the reaction to people’s beliefs. Their policies generate data with low
inﬂation persistence to inﬂuence people’s constant gain learning. Thanks to the lower complexity
of the inference problem adopted here, their results can be corroborated in a very transparent way.
Hidden information is modeled here as a signal extraction problem where the private sector
doesnotobservetherealizationofshocks, butwherethestructureoftheeconomyanditsparameter
valuesaremutuallyknown. Inarationalexpectationsequilibrium, theprivatesectorthenknowsthe
correct policy function but can only imperfectly infer the nature of shocks. This equilibrium notion
is stronger than the self-conﬁrming equilibria considered by Fudenberg and Levine (1993) and
Sargent (1999) or the recursive learning schemes studied for example by Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) or Orphanides and Williams (2005). In those cases, the public beliefs about structural
relations may be erroneous as long as they are justiﬁed by the data generated from the model.
In the rational expectations equilibrium pursued here, the public knows the true policy function
— but not the states driving it. This serves as a useful, non-trivial benchmark for evaluating the
consequences of a superiorly informed policymaker in dynamic economies.
Closest to the simple model studied in Section 2 are the studies by Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986) and Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002). This paper shares with them not only the linear
framework and the Kalman ﬁltering of the public, but also that it casts the policy problem around
unobserved policy goals. New is the general framework capable of handling various models with
endogenous state variables. Faust and Svensson focus on the welfare effects of credibility. Within
a slightly different economic structure (forward-looking Phillips Curve instead of Lucas-supply
curve),30 their results are broadly conﬁrmed here: Outcomes are improved when output targets
are unobservable. (See also the discussion on varying transparency in Section 2.4.) The common
force at work is that the updating of public beliefs depends directly on observed policy. Similar
30A further difference is that their analogue to the iid shock εt is not a target component but a control error of policy.
33to mechanisms discussed by Walsh (2000), this disciplines policy while retaining Markov-perfect
time-consistency.
6 Conclusions
When a policymaker is better informed than the public, public beliefs about his hidden information
become a distinct state variable of the policy problem. These public beliefs are shaped by observed
policy actions, giving a scope for managing beliefs about future policies that is otherwise absent
in a discretionary policy problem. Since public beliefs are a natural state variable under imperfect
information, managing this state of beliefs is Markov-perfect and time consistent.31
This paper solves for the optimal discretion policy in a New Keynesian model with unknown
output targets and ﬁnds that policy contracts the economy in response to inﬂationary beliefs. In
addition, the pursuit of output targets is scaled back, because of their inﬂationary effects on public
beliefs. This policy, in particular its history dependence, shares some similarities with commitment
policies. To the extent that hidden information is a realistic feature of actual policymaking, this
suggests much smaller costs for real-world policymakers from retaining some degree of discretion
as long as they keep public beliefs about their intentions in check.
The stylized model analyzed here implies that intransparency of policy targets is preferable —
at least under discretion. However, an important caveat is that public beliefs matter here only for
linking economic activity to pricing decisions in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve. The welfare
effects of transparency might be subject trade-offs, leading to more differentiated results, when
expectations of future activity were to affect both investment and pricing decisions.
The model gives also rise to belief shocks as a source of business cycle ﬂuctuations. Similar to
the work of Lorenzoni (2006), such shocks shift public perceptions about economics fundamentals,
whilst the actual fundamentals remain unchanged. Under imperfect information, these shifts in
public beliefs are rational since the belief shocks are correlated with informative signals about
31This excludes the explicit reputational mechanisms based on history dependent strategies known from by Barro
and Gordon (1983b) or Chari and Kehoe (1990) are excluded from the analysis.
34fundamentals. The optimal discretion policy seeks to quell the erroneous beliefs arising from these
shocks. In the New Keynesian model studied here, belief shocks induce dynamics similar to cost
push shocks, which is similar to belief shock dynamics found by Angeletos and La’O (2008b)
based on higher-order dynamics.
Apart from illustrating the optimal policy under imperfect information within a widely studied
New Keynesian model, the technical appendix to this paper provides a general solution method
which allows to extend the analysis to larger settings, relevant for practical policy analysis. By
relying on linear quadratic approximations and Gaussian uncertainty, the optimal policy problem
becomes tractable without losing its economic intricacy.
A fruitful area for future research would be to extend the analysis to a policymaker’s propri-
etary information about economic fundamentals, for example determinants of potential output.
Such information would be widely dispersed amongst different members of the public as well
as the central bank, suggesting to combine the policy concepts studied here with the dispersed
information settings studied for example by Lorenzoni (2006) or Angeletos and La’O (2008a).
35Appendix
A Innovation Representation in the Simple Model
This section derives the ARMA(1,1) innovations process (9) for policy in the simple model of
Section 2. First, policy can be separated into innovation and public expectations
xt = fτ˜ τt + fε˜ εt | {z }
˜ xt
+(fτ + fb)τt|t−1 | {z }
xt|t−1
(21)
The ARMA representation follows from using τt+1|t = ρ τt|t and the Kalman ﬁlter to express the
evolution of prior beliefs as
xt+1|t = ρxt + ρ ((fτ + fb)Kτ − 1) ˜ xt
B Kalman Filter in the Simple Model
In the simple model of Section 2, the signal extraction problem of the public uses the policy










Στ + ¯ σ2
where ¯ σ2 ≡ f2
ε/f2
τ · σ2






Στ + ¯ σ2 =
σ2
η
1 − ρ2 ¯ σ2
Στ+¯ σ2
As discussed on Section 2.3, it is plausible to assume that 0 ≤ fτ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ fε ≤ 1, fb ≤ 0,
and fτ + fb ≥ 0. It is then straightforward to verify that −1 ≤ ψ ≤ 0, since the Kalman gains are
positive and fτKτ + fεKε = 1.
36C Compensating Rate of Average Inﬂation
Section 2.4 evaluates ex-ante policy losses based on the policymaker’s objective function
E(Vt) =
E (π2
t + αx(xt − ¯ xt)2)
1 − β
The difference in losses under hidden versus full information, can be expressed as a compensating
rate of average inﬂation, ¯ π, which would equalize policy losses in both equilibria when added to
the dynamics under hidden information.
E((1 − β)Vt|Full Info) = E
 
(πt + ¯ π)
2 + αx(xt − ¯ xt)
2|Hidden Info

As an alternative measure of policy losses, this “compensating average inﬂation” abstracts
from the validity of the linear quadratic framework for non-zero (or non-indexed) inﬂation rates in
steady state.
Since this paper looks only at shocks to output targets, the calibration does not try to match
a level of second moments observed in the data and the compensating rate of average inﬂation is
scaled by the standard deviation of inﬂation under hidden information.
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47Figure 8: Disinﬂation with Exogenous Persistence
(a) Impulse response
(b) Impact Coefﬁcients of xt
Note: Panel (a): Impulse responses of output and inﬂation to a belief shock with varying degrees of price indexation
(γ = {0;0.5;1}) in the Phillips Curve (20). Belief shocks are normalized such that they produce a unit response in
inﬂation on impact. Panel (b) reports the impact coefﬁcients of output in response to such normalized belief shocks
for different values of the indexation rate γ and noise level σ2
n. (Other parameters calibrated as in Table 1.)
48Table 1: Model Calibration
Private Sector Parameters
β 0.99 Time preference
σ 1.00 Risk Aversion / Inverse EIS
θ 0.75 Calvo Probability of not repricing
φ 1.00 Inverse Frisch Labor Elasticity
κ 0.1717 Slope of Phillips Curve: κ = (1 − θ) · (1 − β · θ)/θ · (σ + φ)
Policy Preferences
αx 1.00 Policymaker’s preference for output stabilization Lt + π2
t + αx(xt + ¯ xt)2
Driving Processes
σε 1.00 Volatility of iid target component, εt ∼ N(0,σ2
ε) from ¯ xt = τt + εt
ρ 0.90 Persistence of target component τt+1 = ρτt + ηt+1
ση 1.00 ηt ∼ N(0,σ2
η)
σ¯ x 1.00 Total volatility of output target used for sensitivity analysis. σ¯ x ≡ σ2
ε + σ2
τ/(1 − ρ2)
σn 1.00 Volatility of belief shocks nt ∼ N(0,σ2
n) (Section 3)
Notes: Private-sector parameters taken from Gali (2003)’s calibration to quarterly U.S. data. Innovation variances are
each normalized to unity and not intended to match the scale of any second moments. The sensitivity of results to ρ
and αx is discussed in Section 2.4. As shown there, variations in αx are isomorphic to varying κ. As a measure of
credibility, σn is varied in Section 3.
49MANAGING BELIEFS ABOUT




A A Class of Linear Quadratic Models
The mechanisms of the hidden information policy problem extend beyond the simple model of the
previous sections and are applicable to a general class of linear quadratic environments. It is thus
beneﬁcial to cast the exposition around this more general class of models. The applications pre-
sented in Section 3 (noisy signals, backward looking inﬂation) have already relied on this general
framework.
Again, attention is limited to a Markov perfect, discretionary policy problem. In the spirit
of “bygones are bygones”, state variables in a Markov-perfect equilibrium must be relevant for
current payoffs. The public’s prior beliefs are part of these Markov states since they matter for
public payoffs. A current decision-maker can inﬂuence future decisions only by manipulating the
state of beliefs as well as other endogenous state variables, for example capital, carried forward
into future decision problems. There is no commitment to future policies.
In general, the entire distribution of public beliefs needs to be tracked by the policy problem.
The framework presented here affords a considerable simpliﬁcation, which makes the problem
well tractable: The model is cast in a Gaussian framework with constant variances. Tracking entire
distributions then collapses to tracking only their means and can be handled with the Kalman ﬁlter.
It is the public’s prior, not posterior, beliefs which enter the state vector, since the latter will be
formed after observing current data which is inﬂuenced by current policy.
This section deﬁnes a rational expectations equilibrium where the public forms its posterior
beliefs consistently with the optimal policy function. The policymaker is free to choose policies
which are inconsistent with the public’s belief system, but equilibrium requires that he ﬁnds it
ex-post optimal not to deviate from the policy function assumed in people’s Kalman ﬁlter.
There are four types of variables: 1) Backward-looking variables, Xt, corresponding for ex-
ample to the policy targets τt and εt in the model of the previous sections. 2) Policy controls, Ut,
for example like the output gap above. 3) Publicly observable variables, Zt, coinciding with the
output gap in the simple model. 4) Forward-looking decision variables of the private sector, Yt, likeTECHNICAL APPENDIX iii
inﬂation and the interest rate in the above model.1 They will be treated as vectors of dimensions
Nx, Nu, Nz, and Ny respectively.
The backward looking variables need not only capture exogenous forcing variables like τt and
εt but also endogenous states like capital, habits, or lagged variables, for example inﬂation in a
model with price indexation. They evolve as
Xt+1 = AxxXt + AxyYt + BxUt + Dwt+1 (1)
where wt+1 is an exogenous Nw-dimensional white noise process with variance Ewtw0
t = I.2
The policymaker observes the entire history of wt, denoted wt and will thus have complete
informationabouttherealizationofallvariablesuntiltimet. Incontrast, theprivatesectorobserves
only a linear combination of policy controls and backward looking variables:
Zt = CxXt + CuUt (2)
Z
t = {Zt,Zt−1,Zt−2,...}
The history Zt spans the public information set.3 A sufﬁcient condition to ensure superior infor-
mation of the policymaker is that Nz < Nw. For any variable zt,
zt|t ≡ E(zt|Z
t)
denotes the expectation of zt on the private sector’s information set. Synonymously these expec-
tations will be called public beliefs. In particular, Xt|t−1 are the prior beliefs about Xt before
observing Zt. By construction, Yt = Yt|t always holds since public decisions are based on public
information. In principle, Yt could also be added to the measurement vector, but without adding
1Except for such simple models, the interest rate is typically modeled as the policy control and the output gap is a
forward-looking variable of the private sector.
2Without loss of generality, Xt is constructed such that Nx ≥ Nw.
3In addition, there is no uncertainty about the structure of the economy and the public will know all parameters of
the model, for example the matrices Axx, Axy, Bx and D of equation (1).TECHNICAL APPENDIX iv
new information.
The optimality conditions of private sector behavior are represented by an expectational linear
difference equation involving only publicly observable variables and public sector expectations:4
A
1
yyYt+1|t = AyyYt|t + AyxXt|t + ByUt|t (3)






































where the per period loss function Lt is quadratic in Xt, Yt and Ut, Q is assumed to be a positive
deﬁnite matrix, and the expectation operator is conditional on the history of wt.
In principle, one could also allow for public beliefs Xt|t and Ut|t to enter the loss function.
Except for adding algebraic complexity, this would not raise any further methodological issues.5
In the current form, the loss function (5) depends on public beliefs via Yt = Yt|t.
4Notice that the policy control or parts of Xt are not precluded from entering directly in this forward looking
constraint. This will be the case when, for example, the policy control is publicly observable such that Ut|t = Ut. A
more general way to set up (3) would be to write
A1










then to (3) with Ayx = A2
yx + A3
yx and By = B2
y + B3
y.
5Likewise, linear terms in Xt|t and Ut|t could be added to the transition equation for the backward looking vari-
ables.TECHNICAL APPENDIX v
The Simple NK Model
Equations (1), (2), (3) and (5) describe the class of LQ models for which we seek a solution
to the optimal policy problem under discretion and hidden information. The simple NK model
of Section 2 in the paper can be represented in the general framework as follows: The output gap
equals the policy control, Ut = xt and is also identical to the measurement vector Zt = Ut such that
Cu = 1 and Cx = 0. Furthermore, the backward and forward looking variables are Xt = [τt εt]0,
respectively Yt = πt.
In this model, the backward looking variables are purely exogenous, Axy = 0 and Bx = 0,
which considerably simpliﬁes the solution under symmetric information (Svensson 2007, p. 24).
However, in the hidden information problem the state vector will be augmented by public beliefs
and the state vector will be endogenous. So no additional complication arises from allowing the
backward looking variables in (1) to be partly endogenous, too.
































with Axy = 0 and Bx = 0.
Inﬂation is the only forward looking variable of the private sector, Yt = πt, and the Phillips
Curve corresponds to the associated forward looking constraint with A1
yy = β, Ayy = 1, Ayx = 0,
and By = −κ.
B Private Sector Equilibrium
The policymaker is constraint by the beliefs and the behavior of the private sector. The private
sector is atomistic and takes policies as given. Before turning to optimal policy, it is useful to
consider notions of private sector equilibrium for a given policy. This generalizes the discussion inTECHNICAL APPENDIX vi
Section 2.2 on determining inﬂation for a given policy function.
Attention is limited to time-invariant, Markov-perfect equilibria. Policies will depend only on
current levels of backward-looking variables and prior beliefs about those. In equilibrium, policy






for some F 0
1, F 0
2. Notice that this does not presuppose a commitment of the policymaker to such
a rule. Discretion will rather require that this policy is ex-post optimal, such that the policymaker
has no incentive to deviate once the private sector has formed beliefs consistent with the policy.
For the time being, the discussion adopts now the perspective of the private sector who takes
the policy (6) as given when forming beliefs and making choices. This gives rise to a fairly strong
notion of private sector equilibrium which can be applied to the simple NK model in the paper.
As will be seen shortly, such an equilibrium need not always be unique. As will be shown below,
a weaker notion of “temporary equilibrium” will in general be sufﬁcient to constrain the discre-
tionary policy problem.
Deﬁnition (Private Sector Equilibrium). Given the policy in (6), the private sector equilibrium is
a sequence of observations {Zt}, perceived states {Xt|t}, perceived policies {Ut|t} and private
sector choices {Yt} such that
• Expectations and beliefs are rational. In this linear framework, they are formed using the
Kalman ﬁlter with measurements Zt.
• Choices are optimal, that is they satisfy the forward looking constraint (3).
Using the Kalman ﬁlter, beliefs then evolve as
Xt|t = Xt|t−1 + K





2Xt|t−1 (8)TECHNICAL APPENDIX vii
Amongst others, the Kalman gain K0 depends on the policy coefﬁcients F 0 = [F 0
1 F 0
2] in (6).
Before turning to conditions for existence and uniqueness of the private sector equilibrium, some
details are presented for the Kalman Filter.
Kalman Filter
For the policy given in (6), the private sector’s Kalman ﬁlter combines (6) with (1) and (2) to obtain
the state and measurement equations





Xt + AxyYt|t + BxF
0
2Xt|t−1 + Dwt+1 (9)








and beliefs evolve as
Xt|t = Xt|t−1 + K
0(Zt − Zt|t−1) (11)
with Kalman gain K
K ≡ Cov(Xt,Zt − Zt|t−1) Var(Zt − Zt|t−1)
−1 (12)













0 (14)TECHNICAL APPENDIX viii
The Kalman ﬁlter depends only on the policy coefﬁcients F 0
1, via which policy reacts to Xt, and
is independent of the reaction coefﬁcients associated with the predetermined state variable Xt|t−1.
The presence of private sector controls Yt|t and predetermined variables Xt|t−1 does not affect the
Kaman gain.
The above assumes that the Nz × Nx matrix C has full row rank.6 In principle (and also in
practice) it can happen that C is collinear for some F 0
1. Numerically it is already critical if C
is nearly collinear. This corresponds to situations when there are multiple observables7 which
are (almost) perfectly correlated such that Var ˜ Zt = CΣC0 is ill-conditioned. Economically, this
means that a candidate policy F 0 tries to mimic other signals in Zt. I have never observed such
mimicking strategies in equilibrium, but depending on initial conditions it can occur along the path
of the policy improvement algorithm. In these cases, the Kalman ﬁlter is implemented by pruning
the redundancies in the set of observable variables via a singular value decomposition of C. To
obtain numerically stable solution, this is done for singular values of C smaller than 10−8.
Conditions for Existence and Uniqueness
Optimal choices of the private sector solve the forward-looking constraint (3) given the policy (6)
and private sector beliefs about Xt. Based on the Kalman ﬁlter, (3) and (1), this can be written as
a system of expectational difference equations driven by the iid disturbance ˜ Zt.8:
Xt+1|t = (Axx + Bx ˆ F






yyYt+1|t = (Ayx + By ˆ F




6Recall that Nz < Nw ≤ Nx.
7This is the case in the model with belief shocks in Section 3, but not in the simple model of Section 2.
8Innovations ˜ Zt are deﬁned relative to the public’s prior belief ˜ Zt ≡ Zt − Zt|t−1. By construction they are
orthogonal to prior information of the private sector and are iid under the public’s probability measure.TECHNICAL APPENDIX ix
where ˆ F 0 ≡ F 0















(Axx + Bx ˆ F 0) Axy




collect the coefﬁcients on the endogenous variables.
This is the kind of linear systems studied by King and Watson (1998) and Klein (2000), where
A1
yy is allowed to be singular. And their “counting rules” for stable and unstable roots can be
applied to derive conditions for existence and uniqueness of the private sector equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of Private Sector Equilibrium). Existence and unique-
ness of a private sector equilibrium depend on the roots z of | ¯ Az − ¯ B| = 0 for matrices ¯ A and ¯ B
deﬁned above. A unique equilibrium exists only if there are Nx roots inside the unit circle and Ny
outside. The matrices ¯ A and ¯ B, and thus also the condition for existence and uniqueness, depend
on the policy rule (6) but not on the Kalman gain K0. This is an instance of certainty equivalence
in linear rational expectations systems.
Proof. The result follows from applying the solution methods of King and Watson (1998) or Klein
(2000)tothelinearrationalexpectationssystemabove. Applyingtheirmethodsyieldsthecounting
rule in the proposition and the solution has the form
Yt|t = ¯ GXt|t−1 + Hy ˜ Zt
Xt+1|t = ¯ AXt|t−1 + Hx ˜ Zt
where ¯ G and ¯ A depend only on ¯ A and ¯ B but not on K0 (for given policies, F 0
1 and F 0
2.)
In the simple NK model of Section 2 in the paper, the condition is trivially met9 but in general
this needs not be the case. A pertinent example is the nominal indeterminacy of Sargent and
9Itisstraightforwardtocheckthattherearetwostableroots(ρand0)associatedwiththeexogenoustargetvariables
and one unstable root (1/β) associated with inﬂation, which is the only forward looking variable.TECHNICAL APPENDIX x
Wallace (1975), which holds for any exogenous policy like (6) when the interest rate is the control
variable. This applies also to the New Keynesian model, as discussed for example by Gali (2008).
If a unique solution exists, the construction of the private sector equilibrium is useful to analyze
outcomes under different candidate policies as in Section 2. But for the purpose of constraining
the discretionary policy problem, the above equilibrium notion is actually too strong. In this equi-
librium, private sector expectations treat (6) as a time-invariant policy rule, carried out forever.
And even though this will resemble the equilibrium outcome, it misrepresents the nature of the
discretion problem where the policymaker can reoptimize his plans at each period. Therefore,
non-uniqueness of a private sector equilibrium does not foreclose uniqueness of a discretionary
equilibrium. To constrain the discretion problem, a weaker form of private sector equilibrium is
sufﬁcient. It is a temporary equilibrium in the spirit of Grandmont (1977):
Deﬁnition (Temporary Private Sector Equilibrium). At a given point in time, the private sector
has given beliefs about current policy according to (6). They are embodied in a Kalman gain K0
used to update beliefs about Xt as in (7). Furthermore, people hold possibly different beliefs about




The temporary equilibrium then reduces to optimal choices which satisfy the forward looking
constraint (3) given the beliefs in (15).
In a temporary equilibrium, private sector expectations of future choices are given. It is then
straightforward to substitute the forward-looking variables by a linear combination of publiclyTECHNICAL APPENDIX xi


























The construction his temporary equilibrium is not a special feature of this hidden information
setup. Similar computations are performed for example by S¨ oderlind (1999) in his derivation of
optimal Markov perfect policies under symmetric information.
C Discretion Policy and Equilibrium
Discretionary policy is time-consistent. At each point in time the policymaker can reoptimize
while taking his future optimizations as given. This leads to a recursive representation of the
optimization problem as a dynamic program. The state variables of the policy problem are the
backward looking variables and prior beliefs, there is no further history dependence. Furthermore,
the policymaker must account for the rational expectations and optimal choices of the private
sector. This is summarized in the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition (Discretionary Policy). At each point in time, for given private beliefs embodied in F 0
















u are deﬁned as in (16) above. The constraints correspond to the transition
equation for Xt (1), and the private sector’s temporary equilibrium (16). The continuation valueTECHNICAL APPENDIX xii
of this dynamic optimization problem, V 0




















The solution is then based on iterating between a conventional linear regulator problem and the
























s.t. St+1 = A
0St + B
0Ut + Dwt+1 (19)
for given F 0, G0, a positive deﬁnite V 0 and a scalar v0. The matrices Q0, N0, R0, B0 and D are













The optimal policy is linear as has been anticipated in (6). The policy appears certainty equivalent
since it is independent of the shock loadings D.12 But in fact, the setup of the regulator itself is
10The deﬁnition of the discretion problem takes the matrix V 0 and the scalar v0 as given. In the policy improvement
algorithm used to implement the solution, they will be calculated such as to be consistent with continuing the policy
F 0 and the beliefs G0 forever. This is shown at the end of this section.
11Except for V 0 and v0 matrices with superscript “0” depend on F 0 and G0. As will be see below, also V 0 and v0
can be computed to be consistent with carrying out policies F 0 and G0 forever.
12Certainty equivalence is a well-known result of linear regulator problems (Bertsekas 2005).TECHNICAL APPENDIX xiii
not certainty equivalent since it depends on the private sector’s Kalman ﬁlter. Policies are thus not
certainty equivalent.
Deﬁnition(EquilibriumunderDiscretion). Equilibriumunderdiscretionarypolicymakingconsists
of sequences {Ut}, {Xt}, {Yt} and {Zt} such that each
• Ut solves the policymaker’s problem
• Yt is the solution to a temporary equilibrium whose underlying beliefs are consistent with
the optimally chosen policies Ut
• Xt and Zt evolve according to (1) and (2)
where policies are a time-invariant function of the states.
Formally, this requires that F 0 = F ∗, and G0 = G∗ = G0
x + G0
u(F ∗
1 + F ∗
2), where F ∗
1 and F ∗
2
partition F ∗ conformably with Xt and Xt|t−1. (K0 is then consistent with F 0
1 = F ∗
1.) Furthermore,


















This equilibrium concept is similar to the self-conﬁrming equilibria of Fudenberg and Levine
(1993) and Sargent (1999) in that both are a ﬁxed point of mutual beliefs and actions in multi-
player games. However, in a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, players hold erroneous beliefs about the
structure of the economy, which are justiﬁed by observable outcomes. A similar ﬁxed point of
beliefs and outcomes is used in the limited-information rational expectations equilibria of Marcet
and Sargent (1989a, 1989b) and Sargent (1991). This is different here, where the public completely
knows and understands the structure of the economy.TECHNICAL APPENDIX xiv
D Regulator for Discretion Problem
To set up the linear regulator problem shown in (18) and (19), the temporary equilibrium (16) and
the Kalman ﬁlter (7) can be used to substitute Yt|t out of the loss function (5) and the transition
equation (1) for Xt. The Kalman ﬁlter yields the transition equation for Xt|t−1.
The derivation proceeds by using the temporary equilibrium (16) and the Kalman ﬁlter (7) to
substitute Yt|t out of the loss function (5) and transition equation (1) for Xt. The Kalman ﬁlter also
yields the transition equation for Xt|t−1. The Kalman ﬁlter also depends on a prior belief about
observables Zt|t−1 = CxXt|t−1 + CuUt|t−1 and thus on a prior belief on policy. To simplify the
regulator, it is assumed that this belief is consistent with F 0 (as it will be in equilibrium), such that








The Kalman update can be written as
Xt|t = KCxXt + (I − K ˆ C)Xt|t−1 + KCuUt
Together with the temporary equilibrium (16) this yields
Yt|t = Γ
0




























































































































































Likewise, the state transitions for Xt and Xt|t−1 can be derived as
Xt+1 = (Axx + AxyΓ
0




u + Bx)Ut + Dwt+1
Xt+1|t = AxxKCxXt +




























Axx(I − K ˆ C) + (AxyG0

























Value Function consistent with F 0 and G0
The policy improvement algorithm described in Section E uses a continuation value consistent
with carrying out the policy F 0 forever. The continuation value is linear quadratic in St as in (17).
It is computed from the closed loop representation of the regulator obtained by plugging the policy





















The equation has a unique solution if the matrix in curly braces is positive deﬁnite and if the closed
loop transition matrix (A0 + B0F 0) has all eigenvalues inside the unit circle. The former is
assured by the form of the original loss function13 and the latter holds if a stationary equilibrium
exists.14
Optimal policies are certainty equivalent (for given F 0) and do not depend on v0.15 Still, the








where tr is the trace operator.
13Please recall that Q in (5) is assumed to be positive deﬁnite.
14Efﬁcient methods for solving Lyapunov equations are available for example via the LAPACK routines encoded in
MATLAB or by using the doubling algorithms of Anderson et al. (1995).
15Sargent and Ljungqvist (2004) or Svensson (2007) give further details.TECHNICAL APPENDIX xvii
Unconditionally expected losses are computed from the unconditional variance covariance ma-
trix of the states:
E(V
0


















E Policy Improvement Algorithm
The equilibrium is a ﬁxed point of public beliefs and policy actions and maps (F ∗,G∗,V ∗) into it-
self. An intuitive and efﬁcient way to compute this ﬁxed point is the following policy improvement
algorithm. It is efﬁcient, since policy improvement methods converge faster than value function
iterations (Whittle 1996; Bertsekas 2005).16 It is intuitive, since the algorithm uses the regula-
tor (18) to seek for a one-period deviation from a candidate equilibrium. Non-existence of such a
deviation is the deﬁning property of equilibrium.
Formally, the algorithm starts with a candidate policy F 0 and beliefs G0 and computes the
Kalman gain K0 and continuation value V 0 associated with continuing this policy forever. If the
conditions for a private sector equilibrium are met (Proposition 1), one can even compute the G0
consistent with F 0. The solution (20) to the above regulator problem then yields the optimal one-
period deviation. As long as F 0 6= F ∗ and G∗ 6= G0 there is no equilibrium. In this case, a new
iteration starts using (F ∗,G∗) as new candidate policies.
The difference with a value function iteration is that at each step, the regulator uses a contin-
uation value consistent with carrying out the candidate policy forever whereas a value function
iteration would update V 0
j+1 = V ∗
j at the j-th step. In contrast, the policy improvement algo-
rithm solves at each step an inﬁnite horizon problem, where Kalman gain K0 and continuation
value V 0, and if possible also G0, are consistent with the candidate policy.
16S¨ oderlind (1999) solves for optimal discretionary policies under symmetric information with value function iter-
ations and comments on the slow performance of the algorithm.TECHNICAL APPENDIX xviii
Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Above I argued for uniqueness of the equilibrium in steady state, since the model then collapses
to a full information setting with a unique steady state under simultaneous move timing. But off-
steady state, the above equilibrium is an intricate ﬁxed point between optimal one-period policies
(F ∗), and public beliefs (F 0, G0). Formally, it is a ﬁxed point between two Riccati equations, one
from the policymaker’s regulator problem, combining (20) and (21), the other associated with the
public’s Kalman Filter, see equation (14). Under suitable regularity conditions (Bertsekas 2005),
both solve well-deﬁned problems with unique solutions given the other’s solution. However, to
the best of my knowledge there exist no results on the existence and uniqueness of such nested
systems. This is also the conclusion of Hansen and Sargent (2007, Chapter 15) who solve multi-
player equilibria with similarly stacked Riccati equations.
However, in my practical experience, the algorithm typically converges, and if so always to
the same equilibrium from arbitrary starting values for (F 0,G0). In particular, over a wide range
of calibrations (see Figure 4 in the paper), each equilibrium has been checked by drawing 50
times initial values from a mean zero Normal distribution with variance 10. Given equilibrium
coefﬁcients between zero and one, this is basically a ﬂat prior. Each time, when the algorithm
converges it converges to the same equilibrium.17
17Occasionally an equilibrium might not be found for a particular initial guess. In this case, another draw is made
until the algorithm has converged 50 times.TECHNICAL APPENDIX xix
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